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“In the past, neutrality was normal. Today, it is exceptional.” Thus wrote
Philip Windsor, a noted teacher and scholar of international relations at the
London School of Economics and Political Science, in a book published in
1989 on European neutrality and non-alignment.1 If Windsor’s assessment was
correct in the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War soon thereafter seemingly
made neutrality not only exceptional but nearly extinct. Not so for Cold War
historians, however.
In the early 1990s, historical research on Cold War neutrality entered a
new phase. With access to declassified archival sources, historians were able for
the first time to reconstruct in detail and analyze how Cold War neutrality had
evolved as a policy and practice. In some cases research was conducted through
government-sponsored programs or appointed commissions that looked at
contentious or politically sensitive issues, such as the neutral states’ position
in the strategic and operational military planning of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, in the intelligence activities
conducted by NATO and Warsaw Pact member-states, and in the comparisons
between declaratory foreign policy and its actual execution.
As a result of more than two decades of scholarship, research on Cold War
neutrality has taken a significant leap forward. Based on a continual flow of new
archival findings, the image of the four European “classic” neutrals—Austria,
Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland—has changed considerably. Scholars have
shed light on how neutrality functioned as a part of the Cold War international
system. In particular, recent analyses of Cold War neutrality have stressed
1. Philip Windsor, “Neutral States in Historical Perspective,” in Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel,
eds., Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned States (Washington,
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1989), pp. 3–9.
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the importance of neutrality’s domestic political and ideational dimensions
(neutrality as domestic politics) and its connections to foreign policymaking
(neutrality as foreign policy).
Research linking the domestic sphere with neutrality policy has been
one of the most important contributions to the new Cold War neutrality
scholarship. However, and similar to the research on neutrality as foreign
policy and in strategic studies, these efforts have often continued to follow a
strictly national approach.2 Up to now, no attempt has been made to compare
the results of these studies.3 Hence, in late 2010 we organized a workshop at
the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva
to take stock of the new findings and allow the research on European neutral
states to be put in the broader analytical framework today known as the “new”
Cold War history.4 In putting together this themed issue, we hope to assist
scholars of the Cold War and the history of neutrality in identifying missing
and/or underrated aspects in the debate and in defining fresh and stimulating
research perspectives.
Neutrality has been repeatedly declared extinct in light of the advancing
European integration process and global changes since the end of the Cold
War. Nevertheless, it has remained an issue of interest and a matter of political
debate in the countries under scrutiny here. This is mostly because of domestic
political and ideational considerations, but the outbreak of a crisis over Crimea
in 2014 led to new calls for neutrality being voiced internationally, for example
by Henry Kissinger, one of the most prominent foreign policymakers of the
past century.5 Although it is unclear whether the concept of neutrality will
2. The notable exception is Johanna Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality
in Austria and Finland (New York: Routledge, 2014).
3. Three publications of more recent date, however, deserve to be mentioned, insofar as they provide
important English-language surveys of a select number of neutral states or of a topic also presented
in this issue: Thorsten B. Olesen, ed., The Cold War—and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at
a Crossroads (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004), including contributions on
Sweden and Finland; special issue, Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2008), dealing with national and
international approaches to teaching and research in Cold War history, including contributions on
neutral Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries; and Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds., The
European Neutrals and European Integration 1945–1995 (Vienna: Bo¨hlau, 2000), giving a complete
overview of the European neutrals and the history of the European integration process during the Cold
War.
4. Odd Arne Westad, “Review Essay: A ‘New’ International’ History of the Cold War?” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1995), pp. 483–487.
5. On the domestic dimensions and ideational character of neutrality, see the contributions collected in
Christine Agius and Karen Devine, eds., “Neutrality and ‘Military Non-alignment’: Exploring Norms,
Discourses and Practices,” special issue, Cooperation & Conflict, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2011). For Kissinger
on Crimea, see Henry Kissinger, “How the Ukraine Crisis Ends,” The Washington Post, 5 March 2014,
p. A17. Kissinger avoids the term “neutrality,” recommending Finland’s “fierce independence” as a
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take full root in the Euro-Atlantic strategic context, the past two decades of
domestic consensus- and post-Cold War identity-building have become a key
element in our understanding of European Cold War neutrality. The main
argument in each of the country studies included in this issue is that neutrality
has remained a potent issue for domestic reasons that emerged or continued
long after neutrality had outlived its original functions of providing security
and stability in Europe. At the same time it has become evident that the
conceptualization of neutrality and the policies associated with it during the
Cold War varied in each neutral state—depending on that state’s individual
historical, geostrategic, political, economic, and cultural situation—and in
reality remained narrowly defined by the maneuvering room within which the
superpower-led blocs allowed the neutral states to negotiate. To this end, two
contributions on the superpowers’ perspectives on neutrality complement the
individual country studies in this special issue.
Because the subject of international neutrality is rather remote for most
scholars of Cold War history, an introductory clarification of basic terms
will allow a proper assessment of how the different neutral states understood
neutrality.6 The concept of neutrality was developed in Europe mainly during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The term stems from the Latin ne
uter, meaning “neither of two,” and basically meant non-participation in a war
between other states. Neutrality has both a legal and a political dimension. The
legal basis of neutrality was drawn up at the beginning of the twentieth century
in a code of regulations enshrined in the Hague Conventions of 1907, which
outlined the conduct of neutral states in time of war. Although this set of rules
may seem outdated at the beginning of the 21st century, it still represents
neutrality’s legal core.
The most important aspect of the Hague rules is a neutral state’s right
to the inviolability of its territory and a respect for the integrity of its neu-
tral status by warring parties. However, in accordance with the principle of
abstention, the neutral state must not itself provide any military assistance to
belligerents. A neutral state must also impede or repulse any military activities
by the belligerents on its territory, in its airspace, and in its territorial wa-
ters. By virtue of the obligations of equal treatment, neutral states must apply
posture. In response, however, Finland’s Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen declared that Finland “was not
neutral.” See “Katainen: Finland Is Not Neutral, NATO Is an Option,” Yle Uutiset, 16 March 2014,
p. 8. http://yle.fi/uutiset/katainen_finland_is_not_neutral_nato_is_an_option/7139523.
6. Definitions are taken from Thomas Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE: The N+N States and the
Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp. 29–32. See also Ju¨rg Martin
Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941, rev. ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002), pp. 9–16.
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whatever non-military measures they decide to take, such as export restric-
tions and embargoes, to all belligerents equally. Finally, the neutral states are
to abide by certain restrictions imposed by the belligerents, including limits
on international transports and trade.
In international law, distinctions are further drawn between occasional (ad
hoc, temporary) and permanent (perpetual, everlasting) neutrality. A country
is occasionally neutral when it declares neutrality in a particular war and only
for the duration of that war. A country is permanently neutral when it commits
itself to remain neutral in all future wars, as Switzerland did upon signing a
multilateral agreement with the great powers at the Congress of Vienna in
1815, or as Austria did in a unilateral declaration in 1955 that was followed by
international recognition. By contrast, Sweden’s and Finland’s neutral status
has no domestic or international legal foundation. Instead, it is based on
their foreign policy traditions and unilateral commitment to uphold a policy
of neutrality. The Swedish and Finnish status is therefore termed “de facto
permanent neutrality.”7 This sort of permanent neutrality can, in principle,
be abandoned at any time. However, because the two states’ international
credibility relies heavily on the predictability of their neutrality, both states
during the Cold War tended to follow the same patterns as the permanently
neutral Switzerland and Austria under international law. Within the context
of the East-West conflict, each of the neutral states had to make absolutely
clear that it would never start a war or enter into one unless the state itself was
attacked.
During times of war, no distinction is made between the rights and
obligations of an occasionally neutral state and those of a permanently neutral
state. In peacetime, however, permanent neutrality extends the strict legal
terms of the Hague Conventions, and restrictions on the countries’ foreign
policy are adopted regarding the political dimensions of neutrality. Neutrality
policy, or a policy of neutrality, comprises all measures intended to strengthen
and protect the law of neutrality. Such a policy has no foundation in law but is
mainly defined through customs and practice. As Ju¨rg Martin Gabriel writes,
For an occasional neutral country, this embraces actions to prevent being drawn
into a particular ongoing conflict. For a permanent neutral power, the impli-
cations are broader: it should do nothing to undermine the practicability and,
equally important, the credibility of its neutrality in a future war. A permanent
7. The qualification of Liechtenstein as another de facto permanently neutral state in the Cold War
is contested because the principality never explicitly stated its ambitions for perpetual neutrality and
because its foreign affairs were for so long closely linked to those of Switzerland.
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neutral, therefore, should not enter into peacetime alliances or permit the estab-
lishment of foreign military bases on its soil.8
Each of the neutrals discussed in this special issue clearly falls into the latter
category: each has abstained from joining military alliances, and each has
prevented foreign troops from being stationed on its territory. As a result, the
four European neutrals have prepared to defend themselves against aggression
by relying on their armed forces, leading to the emergence of the concept
of armed neutrality as a national security strategy. Most of the neutral states
went even further during the Cold War. They ensured that their foreign trade
policies would uphold the credibility of neutrality policy and avoid economic
dependencies that would prevent them from maintaining neutrality in time of
war.9
The legal and political definitions of neutrality did not require the citizens
of a neutral country to follow any kind of ideological or “moral neutrality.” In-
deed, none of the four European neutrals was considered ideologically neutral
in the battle of ideas of the Cold War. All four had societies culturally oriented
to the West, with states deeply rooted in liberal traditions, democratic systems
of government, and the principles of private property and a market economy.
The inclusion of Lorenz Lu¨thi’s article on the Non-Aligned Movement
and the Cold War, in this special issue necessitates a further distinction be-
tween the terms “neutrality” and “non-alignment” (or “neutralism”; in Ger-
man, Blockfreiheit).10 The term “non-alignment” is of more recent origin than
“neutrality,” having emerged from within the context of decolonization and
the Cold War during the 1950s. Many newly independent states refused to
align themselves with either of the two contending superpowers or to take a
stand in their conflict. The nonaligned states shared an obligation with the
neutral countries to remain outside the bloc structures. Non-alignment, how-
ever, is neither legal in nature nor based on any neutral rights and duties. Nor
is it related to permanent neutrality. Nonaligned states have gone to war when
8. Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality, p. 12.
9. This is also the main criterion separating the “classic” neutrals Austria, Finland, Sweden, and
Switzerland from the case of Ireland, which joined the European Community as a neutral state as
early as 1973. Ireland’s neutrality was never seen as equivalent to the neutrality of the other European
neutrals at the time and was mainly understood as a historical function of its national independence
policy vis-a`-vis Great Britain. Telling in this regard is the omission of Ireland from the high-level
four-party talks held during the later Cold War years among the neutral foreign ministries.
10. Definitions are taken from Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE, pp. 31–32. See also Hanspeter
Neuhold, “Permanent Neutrality and Non-alignment: Similarities and Differences,” O¨sterreichische
Zeitschrift fu¨r Aussenpolitik, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1979), 79–100; Vladimir Bilandzˇic´ and Stanko Nick, “The
Policy of Non-Alignment of Yugoslavia,” in Karl E. Birnbaum and Hanspeter Neuhold, eds., Neutrality
and Non-Alignment in Europe (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumu¨ller, 1982), pp. 168–195.
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doing so has served their national interest. The criteria for a nonaligned coun-
try were summed up at the preparatory meeting of the nonaligned movement’s
first conference in 1961:
A nonaligned country should adopt an independent foreign policy based on
co-existence of States with different political and social systems and on non-
alignment, or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy, and consis-
tently support movements of national independence. Such a State must not be a
member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of the Great
Power conflict; if it has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power or if it
is a member of a regional defense pact, such an agreement or pact should not be
deliberately concluded in the context of the Great Power conflicts.
Non-alignment is a political concept based on morality, with a clear intention
to promote efforts toward peace, security, and stability in international rela-
tions. Non-alignment originated in India and reached its international heyday
in September 1961 with the Declaration of the Heads of State or Government
of the 25 nonaligned countries in Belgrade. Collectivism was another essential
characteristic of the nonaligned movement in the Cold War. Whereas neutral-
ity is an institution of specifically European origin, non-alignment sprang up
among African, Asian, and Latin American countries. In Europe the move-
ment was originally represented by Yugoslavia and Cyprus, followed later by
Malta.11
In the European Cold War context, non-aligned and permanently neutral
states conformed in their characteristics insofar as both opted for a non-bloc
policy with regard to NATO and the European Community and the Warsaw
Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In contrast, the non-
aligned and permanently neutral states differed most obviously in the legal
status of their non-alignment/neutrality. Whereas permanent neutrality was
defined by a code of international law regulating relations between belligerent
and non-belligerent states, non-alignment was based on no such legal criteria.
Non-alignment comprised more than just the ambition to stay out of armed
conflicts; it included such goals as democratization of the international system,
the reform of the world economic order, and the safeguarding of national
sovereignty, as well as—in the case of Yugoslavia—certain objectives of socialist
internationalism.
The four European neutrals can be grouped into various constellations,
depending on the criteria one chooses to examine. In addition to differing
11. Malta in 1982 even formally proclaimed itself a neutral state, but this status was recognized only
by Italy.
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legal bases, the historical roots, domestic context, and geostrategic position of
each country are also important in their definitions of neutrality, with con-
sequences for the four neutrality concepts that emerged within the European
Cold War. That is, Switzerland pursued a universal outlook for its neutral-
ity policy, whereas Austria’s neutrality, a direct offspring of the superpower
conflict in Europe, was oriented more toward accentuating Austria’s profile
between East and West. In Sweden and Finland, neutrality was developed
within a subregional Nordic context. Given Sweden’s active engagement in the
United Nations (UN), the country’s neutrality also offered an idealistic and
activist global dimension that the Swiss, despite their universal outlook as a
non-member of the UN, could not follow. Sweden and Switzerland, however,
were notably less exposed to Soviet pressure than were Finland and Austria,
geostrategically positioned at the outskirts of Western Europe. Given these
circumstances, Finnish neutrality focused on national sovereignty and inde-
pendence, whereas in neighboring Sweden the main function of neutrality was
to secure national interests by ensuring the maintenance of a strategic balance
in Northern Europe.
A common link between Swedish, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality dur-
ing the Cold War was these countries’ outward-looking approach, whereas
Switzerland was slow in departing from its historically isolationist concept of
neutrality. As the articles in this special issue illustrate, this legacy is—to some
degree—still reflected today. Of the four neutral countries, Switzerland is the
only one that has remained outside the EU. Sweden, Finland, and Austria
joined it after the end of the Cold War, in 1995. Only Austria and Switzerland
still hold to the concept of neutrality in their foreign and security policies.
Sweden and Finland no longer use the term in their official doctrines, and
both have openly contemplated the prospect of joining NATO.
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